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Question regarding correlation of diameter session and origin-host?

+1 vote
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From the RFC 6733, it is clear that diameter session is identified bases on session-id, which has to be globally unique. Also in section 2.5 (Connections vs Sessions), its clearly mentioned that one connection can be used to multiplex multiple diameter sessions.

I have following questions related to diameter session -
Is there any implicit correlation between diameter session and origin-host? Does diameter standard allow different requests for the same session to have different origin-host value? Is there any possible problem if the value of Diameter Identity (part of recommended format for session-id) is different from those present in the request (like origin-host/origin-realm)?

posted Jun 29, 2017 by anonymous

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1 Answer

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Only what is spelled out in the RFC "The Session-Id MUST begin with the sender's identity [...]"

A dubious diameter implementation may decode the session-id extracting what the origin-host might be. But that would be silly since it is already present in the origin-host AVP. Well-behaved diameter implementations treat session-id as an opaque string.

Does diameter standard allow different requests for the same session to have different origin-host value?
Yes, eg RAR and ASR requests will have a typically have an origin-host/realm different from where the session-id was created.

answer Jun 29, 2017 by Luv Kumar
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